Russian Peacekeepers in the 2008 August War

21 ოქტომბერი 2015 Shadow

Due to the importance of investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 2008 war in Georgia, Damoukidebloba.com offers several key circumstances relevant to ICC’s investigation. We believe that in order to have a maximally objective investigation, several facts discussed in the article should be taken into consideration by the ICC Prosecutor and the Georgian Government Respectively.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has addressed the court for authorization to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 2008 war in Georgia. According to the prosecutor’s official statement, among other crimes, she aims to look into the attack on the Tskhinvali based Russian peacekeeping force. According to her statement, based on the existing information, the attack by Georgian forces killed 10 Russian peacekeepers and wounded 30, destroyed the Russian peacekeeping base including the medical facility.

Due to the fact that the open intervention of the Russian Federation in Georgia had begun much earlier than the described Georgian operation, the so called Russian “peacekeepers” had lost their existing mandate and credibility. According to the Russian timeline of events, the Russian military only intervened after the ‘sudden’ Georgian attack; however,

1.On August 7^th, at approximately 23:30, 150 tanks and military trucks of the Russian regular army entered the Roki Tunnel in the direction of Tskhinvali.

2. “The New York Times” published an article according to which Western intelligence services found proof of two battalions of the Russian 58^th army’s 135^th division passing Roki Tunnel between the night of 7^th and the morning of 8^th of August.

3. On 8^th of August at 3:41 and 3:52, Georgian intelligence service obtained two telephone recordings of the separatist border agency workers. These recordings prove that 20 hours before the Georgian counter-attack, Russian military units have entered the Roki Tunnel. It is important to note that Russian officials have never denied the existence of these phone calls and claimed that these units were rotations for the peacekeeping force in Tskhinvali. This is simply erroneous, since according to the existing peace-deal, rotations were supposed to occur during the day and all sides (The Georgian government, OSCE) had to be warned one month in advance before such a rotation would take place. The previous rotation of Russian peacekeepers took place in May 2008. 

Nevertheless, due to the fact that the ICC prosecutor considers the Georgian attack on the Russian “peacekeeping” force in the context of crime, it is now of outmost importance to reflect on the mission of Russian peacekeeping forces in Georgia. What role did these divisions play in bringing the conflict to a halt and did they have the required mandate? 

Prior to outlining the chronology of the 2008 war, it is necessary to clarify in what cases could the Russian peacekeepers lose their mandate and thereafter we can make objective conclusions.  

The United Nations has developed three key principles that all peacekeeping operations needs to follow:

       1. Consent of the parties

       2. Impartiality

       3. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate

Also according to paragraph 5 of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent Nations) Military Observation and Peacekeeping Operations Agreement (20 March, 1992) peacekeepers need to be impartial and it is impermissible that peacekeepers take part in military operations in favor of any  side involved in the conflict. 

Accordingly, the violation of the above mentioned principles will automatically put the peacekeeping mandate in question. Therefore, while portraying the chronological timeline, one needs to have these principles in mind and analyze whether they have been complied with or not.

As a result, we offer our reader few facts that will shed light on the Russian “peacekeepers’” encounter with the Georgian military.  

In spite of the Georgian military attack on Ossetian separatist positions with artillery fire on August 7^th, the Russian peacekeeping bases around Tskhinvali were not under threat. Georgian forces did not have orders to open fire in the direction of these positions (regardless of the fact that the Russian intervention had already begun).   This is proven by the video below that was taken on 8^th of August (at 5:40). While Georgian troops were heading towards Ossetian separatist positions, the Russian peacekeeping base continued to function without impediment. No entity attacked, destroyed or disarmed them.

In this case, what happened in Tskhinvali and caused the Georgian military to open fire in the direction of the Russian “peacekeeping” unit? In order to investigate this, we want to study several episodes.

 Lieutenant Oleg Golovanov

On November 22^nd 2008, the analytical online newsletter, “Ossetian Radio and Television” published an article on its website called - “Oleg Golovanov Died Heroically in a Military Operation”. According to the article, 32 year old Oleg Golovanov served in the department of intelligence of the Ossetian defense ministry as a troop commander. On August 7^th, lieutenant Golovanov was conducting military directives. Specifically, he was tasked with finding out the enemy (Georgian militaries) targets and readjusting artillery fire on their positions. According to the very same article, the Ossetian separatist aimed at Georgian military from the Russian peacekeeping grounds. The aim was taken from the roofs of the barracks of Russian peacekeepers.

After the Georgian side calculated the location of the Ossetian artillery adjuster (probably through radio-connection direction finding) they opened fire in his direction and he died. Moreover, other sources prove that Oleg Golobanov was the first casualty on the Russian peacekeeping ground in Tskhinvali. 

For example, the famous Russian military journalist Alexander Viktorov’s article, “One Year After the August War: How Were the Peacekeepers Betrayed?” Direct witnesses, such as the medical stuff of the peacekeeping ground, approve of these facts.

In addition, indirectly (in this case, the deceased Golobanov is mentioned as a peacekeeper and not as a fighter of the Ossetian defense ministry) this is buttressed by General Kulakhmetov of the Russian peacekeeping force. To specify, within the enquiry of the Russian Investigation Committee, Kulakhmetov’s testimony claims that the Georgian side opened fire on the observation post, which caused the death of one and wounded another peacekeeper.

It is interesting that after the news had spread, the Ossetian media outlet immediately deleted their above-mentioned article about Golobanov’s death. The primary link does not exist anymore: http://osradio.ru/genocid/10778-oleg-galavanov-pogib-projaviv-muzhestvo-i-geroizm.html; however, screenshots and copies of the article are kept and still exist on other web-sources.

It is also worth mentioning that regardless of the testimony of a witness (Irina Kuksenkova, correspondent of Moscow Komsomolets) regarding the burial of Oleg Golovanov in Tskhinvali 

the Ossetian military crime investigation commission claims that the location of his corpse is unknown.

Nevertheless, regardless of what happened after the death of Golovanov, a crucially important fact from the above-given information is that the troop commander of Ossetian defense ministry’s intelligence department had been in no other place than the Russian peacekeeping base and on the roof of the barracks on 7^th and 8^th of August , where an observation post was colluded. It was from this location that the artillery was adjusted and directed towards the Georgian military. There is no doubt that such action could have only taken place with the approval of the Russian peacekeepers. Moreover, the following events show that the response to fire from the Georgian side wounded one Russian peacekeeper on top of Golobanov, meaning that Russian peacekeepers were already directly involved in combat operations and were side to the conflict.

Open Fire from Russian Peacemakers

There is an online video dated 8^th of August, 6:00 in the morning, which portrays the situation on the Russian peacekeeping ground. This was the first time when fire was exchanged between Georgian and Russian forces. The video proves that the Russian base is not damaged by artillery fire and you can hear heavy crossfire and simultaneously at the 6^th, 37^th, 64^th and 71^st seconds you clearly hear Russian officers ordering their soldiers to stop shooting. At 3:15 you see the observation post at the roof of the barracks where the Georgian fire was being shot at. This is exactly the same place where Golovanov was positioned to locate targets for the Ossetian (Russian) artillery fire.   

At 1:35, you hear the order, “do not shoot from there, they will fire back at the medical point”. Correspondingly the video proves the fact that the Russian peacekeepers were already involved in combat against Georgian units before a Georgian tank opened fire on the observation system on roof of the Russian peacekeepers’ barracks. The video also reveals that the Russian peacemakers not only use artillery fire but also anti-tank rockets.

In addition to this, different testimonies conclude that Russian peacekeepers were ordered to stop the advance of the Georgian armed forces by any means.  Even though, the existing links with information on this issue were deleted, they are all copied and kept by famous Russian independent political expert A. Ilarionov in an article dedicated to this topic.

Important to note is that the second loss of the Russian peacekeeping force occurred outside the base. General Kulakhmetov stated that he ordered an infantry battalion to head towards Niqozi in order to stop the confrontation of the sides according to the mandate. 

After intensive bilateral fire and casualties, such an order from the Russian peacekeeping force seems humorous.  On the picture below, one can observe the destroyed Russian combat vehicles.

The described facts and analysis in this article points towards one simple conclusion, that the so called Russian “peacekeepers” had lost their mandate in the Tskhinvali region. Moreover, they constituted a side to the conflict and were involved in combat against the Georgian armed forces. 

The Georgian investigation agencies could not possibly investigate all the facts listed in this article, because they did not have access to the territories beyond their control. At the same time, we believe that the ICC Prosecutor and the Georgian government must pay attention to the above-described facts in order to achieve a maximally objective and well-documented investigation.